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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellant/Respondent, : 
v. : 
RYAN WAYNE JOHNSON, : Case No. 20050599-SC 
20040552-CA 
Appellee/Petitioner, : 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
"Whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is sufficient to meet the 
criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302." See Order in 
Addendum A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for correctness. See In re 
A.T.. 2001 UT 82, If 5, 34 P.3d 228. The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's 
statutory interpretation for correctness. State v. Ireland. 2005 UT App 209, U 6, 113 P.3d 
1028 (citing State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275,14, 98 P.3d 433). 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' decision in State v. Johnson. 2005 UT App 210 
(Memorandum Decision) is in Addendum B. A copy of the companion case, State v. 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 in Addendum C. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' decision on the issue 
set forth above. See Order in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2002). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The texts of the following statutes are in Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an Information filed January 9, 2004, the State charged Appellee Ryan W. 
Johnson ("Appellee" or "Mr. Johnson") with four counts of aggravated robbery, first 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (2003).1 R.l: 6-9. Another 
Information was filed on the same day charging Mr. Johnson with two additional counts 
of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies. R.2: 6-8. Following bind-over (R. 173), Mr. 
Johnson filed a memorandum in support of a motion to reduce the six counts of 
aggravated robbery to second degree felonies. R.1: 135-139. After the State responded 
(R.l: 140-146; R.2: 35-41, 44-50), the trial court held a hearing on the motion on May 
19, 2004. R. 174. The trial court granted the motion and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on July 1,2004. R.1: 167-172; R.2: 58-63; 173:15-16. 
!The Information incorrectly cites aggravated robbery as a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-301. R.l:6-9 
2 
On June 22, 2004, the State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court. R.l: 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the 
interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals for disposition. R.l: 165 -166. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it erred in 
reducing five counts of aggravated robbery to simple robbery. See Johnson, 2005 UT 
App 210 at 115. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to reduce one 
count of aggravated robbery to simple robbery. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Two different Informations filed on January 9, 2004, charged Mr. Johnson with a 
total of six counts of aggravated robbery. R.l: 6-9; R.2: 6-8 . The Informations allege 
that Mr. Johnson was the individual responsible for these crimes which occurred in 
December 2003 and January 2004. R.l. 6-9: R.2: 6-8. The following facts are taken 
from the preliminary hearing held on February 10, 2004. R. 173. 
Case No. 041900176 
Count I: On December 21, 2003, Lisa Ovard, store manager, was working at the 
Sinclair gas station on 3310 South and 700 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:9. "A 
gentleman came in with his head wrapped up in a white T-shirt and walked up to the 
counter." R. 173:9. Ovard thought the man was wearing the T-shirt around his head 
because it was cold outside. R. 173:10. The man had his right hand in his front coat 
pocket. R. 173:11. With his right hand in his pocket, the man placed his hand on the 
counter pointing it towards Ovard and placed a "Spitz Sunflower Seed bag on the 
counter" and asked Ovard to "put the money in the bag." R. 173:10. Ovard asked the 
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man if he wanted the change also. R. 173:11, The man replied that he wanted the 
quarters. R. 173:11. Ovard did not see anything in the man's hand. R. 173:13. Ovard 
thought the object in the coat pocket "was either a gun or a finger." R. 173:14. The man 
did not make any motions with his hand such as moving his arm up and down. R. 
173:14. Although Ovard did not know if he had a gun she testified that she was afraid for 
her life. R. 173:11. The man did not say that he had a gun, did not make any threatening 
gestures, and did not threaten Ovard that he was going to harm her in any way. R. 
173:15-16. 
Count II: On December 22, 2003, Cynthia West, was working as a cashier at 
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:17. While West was 
changing the coffee filters, a man came in wearing a scarf over his face. R. 173:17. The 
man handed West a bag that West thought he wanted to have thrown away. R. 173:18. 
The man told West to "Fill it" with money. R. 173:18, 21. West noticed that man had his 
right hand in his pocket of his sweatshirt which looked like he had a gun. R. 173:18. The 
man raised up his hand in his pocket about waist high with his index finger extended. R. 
173:23. The man did not point it at her. R. 173:24. West told police that she "didn't 
know whether it was his finger or a Tootsie Roll or a gun." R. 173:19, 23. Although, the 
man did not tell West he had a gun, did not make any threats, and did not make any 
aggressive motions towards her, West testified that she feared for her life. R. 173:19, 23. 
West opened up the register and gave the man all the cash and asked him if he wanted all 
the coins as well. R. 173:18. The man said he wanted the quarters. R. 173:19. West 
then said "Here's a couple of gold dollars for you, too." R. 173:19. West then asked if 
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she could get the man anything else and he said "No, that's all I need." R. 173:19. West 
then said "Alrighty then, you have a good day." R. 173:19. 
Count III: On December 23, 2003, Jennifer Forsgren worked as a cashier at 
Tesoro on 1200 West and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:27. A man came into the 
store with a scarf wrapped around his head covering his face except for his eyes. R. 
173:28. Because it was cold outside, Forsgren did not think anything of it. R. 173:28. 
The man put a bag on the counter and said "Put the money in the bag." R. 173:29. The 
man had his right hand in his pocket and Forsgren assumed he had a gun. R. 173:29. 
However, the man did not have any of his fingers protruding in his pocket and did not 
raise it up in any manner. R. 173:32. The man just kind of stood there with his hand 
resting in his pocket. R. 173:32. Forsgren put the money in the bag and gave it to the 
man. R. 173:29. The man never said he had a gun or a weapon of any kind. R. 173:32. 
The man did not threaten Forsgren or move towards her in any threatening manner. R. 
173:32. Even though it was cold outside, Forsgren assumed he had a gun because he had 
his hand resting inside his pocket. R. 173:33. 
Count IV: On December 24, 2003, Allan Cantonwine was working as a clerk at 
Phillips 66 on 315 East and 3900 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:35. As he came in for 
work, his co-worker, Myeong-Ock Kim, asked him "How do you open the register?" R. 
173:35. There was a man with a thick jacket on and a white scarf over his face behind 
the counter with Kim. R. 173:35, 42. There was a baggy sitting on the counter and the 
man told Cantonwine to put the money in the bag. R. 173:37. Cantonwine put the 
money in the bag because he received training while working at 7-eleven to "always do 
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what you're told." R. 173:37. Cantonwine noticed that the man had his hand in his 
pocket with a finger extended. R. 173:37. Cantonwine testified that it could have been a 
candy bar, a finger, or a gun. R. 173:37. However, if it was a gun, he "didn't want him to 
shoot [Cantonwine]. If it was his finger, [Cantonwine] didn't care. [He] was just going to 
do what [he] was told." R. 173:38. The man never said he had a gun, never told 
Cantonwine that he would be harmed, and did not make any verbal threats at all. R. 
173:44. 
Case No, 041900182 
Count I : On January 6, 2004, Julie Valdez was employed at A Appliance & 
Refrigeration on 501 East and 2700 South in Salt Lake City. R. 173:60. A man came in 
and Valdez asked him if she could help him. R. 173:61. The man said "Give me your 
money." R. 173:61. The man "protruded whatever he had in his pocket." R. 173:63. 
"Whether it was a gun or not, [Valdez did not] know." R. 173:63. Valdez testified that 
she "didn't think he [had a gun] because the bulge wasn't big enough." R. 173:66. 
Valdez told the man that she "didn't have any" money. R. 173:62. The man said "yes, 
you do." R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that she didn't keep money there and asked the 
man if he saw a cash register around. R. 173:62. The man thought the microfiche 
equipment was a register. R. 173:62. Valdez told the man that it was a microfiche 
machine and again stated that she did not have any cash. R. 173:62. The man looked at 
Valdez and asked as if he had given up "you don't have even $20?" R. 173:62. Valdez 
2
. The state does not challenge the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's ruling 
that Count I in the January 2004 incident constituted a robbery rather an aggravated 
robbery. Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 at [^5 
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said "no. I told you, I don't have any money." R. 173:62. The man then turned and left. 
R. 173:62. Valdez testified that the man never said he had a gun and never threaten her. 
R. 173:66. Valdez testified that the man "was very nice-spoken, soft-spoken, not 
aggressive, not anything that would make you think that he was going to cause you harm. 
He was a nice-spoken young man." R. 173:66. 
Count II: On January 6, 2004, Ester Cho was working at her store, Young's Food 
Mart, on 1249 South 900 East in Salt Lake City. R. 173:69. A man came into the store 
and walked up to the counter with his hand pointed in his pocket and asked Cho for 
money. R. 173:70. Cho "didn't know exactly what it was [in the man's pocket] but it 
scared" her. R. 173:71. Although Cho had more money in the register, she gave him $20 
and told the man he was "committing a crime." R. 173:71, 72. The man responded that 
he would pay her back and then left the store. R. 173:71. The man did not tell Cho he 
had a gun and did not say anything threatening towards her. R. 173:72-73. 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the trial court bound Mr. Johnson 
over on all six felony counts of aggravated robbery. R. 30-31; 173:87; R.2: 28-29. On 
May 3, 2004, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to reduce Counts I through IV in Case No. 
041900176 and Counts I and II in Case No. 041099182 to second degree felonies. Rl. 
135-139. On May 13, 2004 the State filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Johnson's 
motion. R.1: 140-146; R.2: 35-41, 44-50. On May 19, 2004, the trial court held a 
hearing on Mr. Johnson's motion to reduce all six counts from aggravated robberies to 
simple robberies. R. 174. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Mr. 
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Johnson's motion finding that under the facts of this case, more is required to show 
aggravated robbery than just a hand in the pocket. R. 174:16. 
The State filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. 
R. 163. On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court transferred the interlocutory appeal to the 
court of appeals for disposition. R. 165. On May 12, 2005, the court of appeals issued its 
memorandum decision reversing the trial court's decision on five of the six counts. See 
Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 at | 5 . In reversing the trial court's decision, Ihe court of 
appeals relied on its opinion issued the same day in the identical case State v. Ireland, 
2005 UT App 209. See Johnson, 2005 UT App 210 at lf3. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery, Utah's statutory scheme 
requires more than the use or threatened use of a facsimile or representation of a 
dangerous weapon Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(6). The legislature defined dangerous 
weapon for the purposes of aggravated robbery as not only a representation or facsimile 
of a dangerous weapon, but in addition, that the representation or facsimile be used in a 
way that leads the victim to reasonably believe that it is likely to cause death or, in the 
alternative, that the actor represents that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. In order 
to give meaning to all of the words in the statute and preclude subsections (i) and (ii) 
from being superfluous, a robber must do something in addition to using or threatening to 
use a facsimile or representation. Even if a concealed hand in the pocket qualifies as a 
representation under the first part of the statute, a further representation, verbal or 
otherwise, that the robber will use the gun or objective facts that make it reasonable to 
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believe that the item is likely to cause death is required in order to elevate the crime to 
aggravated robber. A concealed gesture in a pocket does not meet this definition. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. A CONCEALED GESTURE OF A HAND IN A POCKET IS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE CRITERIA FOR AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-302 
The only issue throughout this case has been whether Petitioner committed the 
crime of simple or aggravated robbery when he made a concealed gesture with his hand 
in his pocket but made no verbal or other representation that he had a dangerous weapon 
or that he would use a weapon as part of the robbery. The relevant statutes require that in 
order to use or threaten to use a dangerous weapon so as to elevate a crime from simple to 
aggravated robbery, a person must use or threaten to use a facsimile or representation of a 
weapon and must further represent that he is in control of a dangerous weapon Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(6) Since gesturing with a hand in a pocket fails to meet these 
requirements, a concealed gesture of a hand is not sufficient to elevate a robbery from a 
simple to aggravated robbery. 
This Court's primary goal in interpreting statutes "is to evince 'the true intent and 
purpose of the Legislature.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1J52, 63 P.3d 621 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, this Court looks to the plain language of the statute which 
provides the Court "with the road map to the statute's meaning." Id. "[T]he plain 
language of the statute [is read] as a whole, and . . . its provisions [are interpreted] . . . in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 
2003 UT 12, ^ jl7, 66 P.3d 592 (citation omitted). Words in a statute that have a 
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commonly accepted meaning should be given that common, lay meaning unless there is 
an indication that the legislature intended otherwise. Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 
2002 UT App 221, [^12, 51 P.3d 1288. The Court's purpose in interpreting the statute is 
"'to render all parts . . . relevant and meaningful,' and [this Court] presume[s] the 
legislature used each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary meaning.'" 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at f 52 (citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003) outlines the elements for simple robbery. 
Pursuant to that provision, a person commits a simple robbery if s/he uses force or fear to 
take personal property from another or uses force or fear against another in the course of 
committing a theft. Id- Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 provides: 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear; or 
(b)The person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft. 
(2) An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in 
an attempt to commit theft, commission of theft, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. This provision demonstrates that all robberies, regardless of 
whether a dangerous weapon is used, require that force or fear be used against the victim. 
A robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery when the robber uses or threatens 
to use a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003) outlines the elements for 
aggravated robbery, stating in relevant part that "[a] person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing a robbery, he: [ ] uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
10 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). Pursuant 
to this provision, a robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery when the robber not only 
uses force or fear, as required for robbery, but also uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (2003). 
Whether a robber has used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon is controlled 
by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (2003) which defines "dangerous weapon." Pursuant 
to this provision: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim 
to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner 
that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). 
Under the predecessor to these statutes, a defendant did not commit aggravated 
robbery when he held his hand in his pocket up over the counter pointing at the victim as 
if it were a gun and threatened to "blast" people if they did not cooperate. State v. 
Suniville, 741 P.2d 961, 962 (Utah 1987). This Court concluded that the defendant's 
menacing gesture with his hand in his pocket, coupled with a verbal threat to shoot did 
not elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery in Suniville because the version of the 
statute then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where the perpetrator used 
"a firearm or facsimile of a firearm." Id. Because Suniville did not use a weapon or a 
replica of a weapon and his "menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats" did not 
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establish use of a firearm, this Court held that Suniville committed the crime of simple 
robbery when he made those gestures with his hand in his pocket and threatened to 
"blast" people. Id. at 965. 
In reaching its decision in Suniville, this Court was careful maintain the distinction 
between robbery and aggravated robbery. Id. This Court recognized that all robberies 
involve force or fear, but that robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery not because it 
generates fear but because, as required by the then applicable language, the robber used a 
weapon or a facsimile thereof. Id. at 964-65. This Court concluded that it "must observe 
[the] critical distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery where the evidence is 
only of verbal threats and intimidating gestures" in order to ensure that a distinction 
exists between simple and aggravated robbery. Id. at 965. This Court concluded that 
Suniville5s "menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence 
alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold otherwise 
would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory distinction 
between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id. 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986), relied upon by this 
Court in Suniville, 741 P.2d at 965, likewise recognized that because the threat of 
physical harm exists in all robberies, something more than such a threat must be used to 
elevate a crime from simple to aggravated robbery. Williams, 721 S.W.2d at 711-713. A 
threat to kill someone accompanied by the defendant reaching toward his back pocket 
was not enough to elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery in Williams because the 
robber did not represent an instrument, and labeling the crime as an aggravated robbery 
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under the circumstances would blur the distinction between simple and aggravated 
robbery. Id. at 711. Although the victim in Williams believed that the defendant might 
have a weapon, the court rejected the aggravated robbery charge because a threat of harm 
also exists when a simple robbery occurs and the two charges must be distinguished by 
something other than the threat of physical harm. Id. 
The Commonwealth supports the conviction by asserting: "It is not fatal that 
Appellant threatened with an unseen weapon or instrument... . The culpability 
of the defendant's intent is manifested by his threat of physical harm and danger to 
the victim exists from the response to fear he perceives as reasonable." This, 
however, does not distinguish it from second degree robbery in which the threat of 
physical force is the gravamen. A response of perceiving danger is quite real 
under threat; however, such cannot serve to convert something merely speculated 
upon (a weapon or instrument) into established existence. 
Id. at 712. 
Additionally, the Williams court recognized that the victim's response to a threat 
cannot define the nature of the crime and a victim's speculation that there might be a 
weapon does not support an aggravated robbery charge. Id. This is so because the 
degree of the crime would be left to the subjective response of the victim rather than the 
actions of the perpetrator, and there would be no objective guidelines for an aggravated 
robbery charge. Id. Although the victim in Williams believed that the defendant might 
have had a weapon, the court rejected the aggravated robbery charge in part because the 
determination of whether a robbery is aggravated cannot be defined by the reaction of the 
victim. 
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice of 
a victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of 
events and could lead to convictions for crimes neither intended nor 
enacted. Our heritage of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact 
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is that although force was threatened, the presence of a weapon or 
instrument was illusory at best. Without an instrument's ever being seen, 
an intimidating threat, albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot 
suffice to meet the standard necessary for a first degree robbery conviction. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
While the statutory language changed following Suniville, the concerns expressed 
in Suniville and Williams that the statute must draw a clear distinction between simple 
and aggravated robbery remain. The actions necessary to elevate a robbery to an 
aggravated robbery cannot be left to the subjective reaction of the victim and instead 
must be guided by a statutory definition that provides a workable distinction between 
simple and aggravated robbery. Otherwise, the aggravated robbery statute would be 
applied inconsistently based on the predilections and emotions of victims and defendant 
would be left without a means for defending against the elevation. See Suniville, 721 
P.2dat965; Williams, 721 P.2d at 711-12; see also People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 
(Mich. App. 2001) (applying objective approach when determining whether victim 
reasonably believed defendant was armed). 
Following Suniville, the Utah legislature amended the aggravated robbery 
statutory scheme. Whereas the pre-Suniville aggravated robbery statute allowed a 
robbery to be elevated only when the robber used or threatened to use a firearm or knife 
or a facsimile thereof, the post-Suniville statute expanded the definition of dangerous 
weapon to include circumstances where a defendant uses or threatens to use a facsimile 
or representation, coupled with a further representation or use so as to justify elevating 
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the charge to an aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (1989); compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b) (2003). 
While use of an actual weapon qualifies as a dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-l-601(5)(b) also defines a dangerous weapon as "a facsimile or representation of an 
item; and (i) use or apparent use of that item in a manner that leads the victim to 
reasonably believe that the item is capable of causing serious injury or death or (ii) a 
representation verbally or in any other manner that the robber is in control of a dangerous 
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (emphasis added). Under the plain language 
of this statute, in order to elevate a simple robbery based on use of a dangerous weapon, 
the robber must not only use or threaten to use a facsimile or representation of a weapon, 
but must also do something further to lead the victim to reasonably believe that he has a 
dangerous weapon or to represent that he has control of a dangerous weapon. The choice 
of the word "and" demonstrates that this statute requires not just a facsimile or 
representation but also something in addition which would make it reasonable to elevate 
the crime even though an actual weapon was not used. See generally Travelers/Aetna 
Ins. Co., 2002 UT App 221 at |^ 12 (words should be given their commonly accepted 
meaning). 
The statute also outlines the "something further" that is required, supplying two 
alternatives, either of which will elevate the use or threatened use of a facsimile or 
representation to an aggravated robbery. First, if the robber uses an item that is a 
facsimile or representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in 
a manner that leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is likely to cause such 
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injury or death, the crime is elevated to an aggravated robbery. Because of the concerns 
about defining a crime based on the subjective response of victims, the belief that the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury should be objectively reasonable. 
See e.g. Williams, 721 S.W.2d at 711; Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 59. Alternatively, when a 
robber uses or threatens use of a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon, the 
crime can also be elevated when the robber represents verbally or in some other manner 
that he is in control of a dangerous weapon. These alternative requirements added onto 
the use of a facsimile or representation demonstrate that the additional requirements must 
be met in order to elevate the crime to a first degree felony. 
The timing of the amendment and its language suggest that the legislature meant 
to encompass the circumstances of Suniville so that they would qualify as an aggravated 
robbery under the amended statute. Applying the amended statute to Suniville's actions, 
the menacing gesture would arguably fit within the first part of the statute as a 
"representation of an item," while the verbal representation by Suniville that he would 
use the item to cause death or serious bodily injury satisfied the second part. In other 
words, under the amended version of the statute, Suniville's actions would qualify as an 
aggravated robbery because he not only threatened use of a "representation" but, in 
addition, he further verbally represented that he would use a gun to "blast" people. See 
generally Suniville, 741 P.2d at 765 (outlining facts). 
While the legislature apparently intended to incorporate the Suniville facts into the 
definition of aggravated robbery, it nevertheless took care to draw a distinction between 
simple and aggravated robbery and to require more than simply a "representation" of an 
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item in order to elevate the crime. This is evident since the legislature did not simply 
amend the statute to include use or threatened use of a "representation" along with a 
"facsimile" as items that would elevate the crime. Instead, the legislature expanded the 
definition of dangerous weapon to include a "representation," but also required, in 
addition, one of the further circumstances outlined in section 76-l-601(5)(b)(i) and (ii). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5). Because this Court must render all parts of the statute 
relevant and meaningful and presume that the legislature carefully chose its terms, it must 
presume that subsection (i) and (ii) play a role in this statute. Interpreting the dangerous 
weapon definition to require only a "representation" of a dangerous weapon without 
imposing the additional requirements of (i) or (ii) would render those subsections as well 
as the word "and" meaningless and superfluous. Accordingly, in interpreting the 
dangerous weapon statute, this court should require not only a representation of a 
dangerous weapon but also something further that fits within the requirements of one of 
these subsections. 
This Court's decision in State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1989) is 
consistent with this requirement that something more than a single representation of a 
dangerous weapon is required to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. In that case, 
this Court interpreted section 76-l-601(5)(b) in the context of an aggravated sexual 
assault conviction and held that a defendant's statement "that he had a gun and would use 
it to blow [the victims'] heads off if they came down the hall during the attack" qualified • 
as threatened use of a dangerous weapon. Id. This Court defined a threat as "the 
expression of an intention to inflict injury on another" and recognized that "[tjhreats may 
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be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words." Id. (further citations 
omitted). While this Court rejected Hartmann's claim that verbal threat was not enough 
to find use of a dangerous weapon, the facts in Hartmann nevertheless show both a verbal 
representation by the defendant that he has a gun and, in addition, a verbal representation 
that he would use that gun. Id. at 545. This is consistent with the language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-601 which requires more than simply a representation of a dangerous 
weapon. 
The court of appeals has also required both the use or threatened use of a facsimile 
or representation and either use that leads to a reasonable belief that the item can cause 
death or serious bodily injury or a representation by the robber that he is in control of an 
item that can cause death or serious bodily injury. See e ^ State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 
312 (Utah 1992) (robber who told victim he would shoot her if she called police and put 
hand on bulging pocket, led victim "to believe he had a gun and reasonably fear for her 
physical safety"); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah App. 1995) (claim by robber 
that he had a gun and threat to use it elevated crime to aggravated robbery). 
In Candelario, the court of appeals concluded that a representation under the first 
part of the dangerous weapon statute includes both physical and verbal "representations." 
Id. at 278. In reaching this decision, the court indicated that "representation" "is an 
expansive term, and, while it can mean 'a likeness, picture, model, or other reproduction,5 
it can also refer to 'a statement or account especially made to convey . . . [an] impression 
of something with the intention of . . . influencing action.'" Id. (quoting Webster's 
Third New Int'l. Dictionary 1926 (1986)). Consistent with Hartmann, the court of 
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appeals concluded in Candelario that a verbal representation that a robber has a gun 
meets the first part of the definition for dangerous weapon found in section 76-1-601(5). 
Moreover, while the robber's claim that he had a gun was a representation that met the 
first part of the statute, his indication that he would kill the cashier met the second 
requirement because the robber verbally represented that he was in control of and would 
use a dangerous weapon. Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601(5)(b). Under these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved 
was based on meeting the two aspects of the definition set forth in section 76-l-601(5)(b) 
and was not left to the subjective reaction of the victim. 
The court of appeals also analyzed whether a crime was elevated to an aggravated 
robbery by the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon in State v. Reyos, 2004 UT 
App 151, 91 P.3d 861 and Adams, 830 P.2d 310. That court did not look to the 
subjective reaction of the victim in either of those cases and instead concluded that the 
defendant had used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon when he verbally 
represented that he had a gun and either put his hand on a bulging pocket or further 
represented that he would use the gun to "shoot to kill." Reyos, 2004 UT App 151 at ^ 4; 
see also Adams, 830 P.2d at 313. Since the defendant in both Reyos and Adams did 
something more than simply use or threaten to use a facsimile or representation of an 
item, the court of appeals concluded that the circumstances in those cases met the 
definition of dangerous weapon. 
Requiring a representation of a dangerous weapon coupled with something further 
in order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery is consistent with the line drawn by 
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the Michigan courts between robbery and aggravated robbery. The Michigan statute, 
which is similar but not identical to Utah's, elevates a robbery to aggravated robbery 
when a robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a 
manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous 
weapon." Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 57 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. § 28.797). In feigned weapon cases, the Michigan courts have required an 
objectively reasonable belief that the robber is armed and have drawn "an absolute 
minimum level of evidence sufficient to support an armed robbery conviction." People v. 
Banks, 563 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Mich. 1997) (citing People v. Jolly, 502 N.W.2d 177, 182 
(Mich. 1993)). 
The "absolute minimum" necessary for a robbery to be aggravated is found in 
Jolly where there was a verbal threat that the robber would shoot if the victim did not 
comply and a bulge in the robber's vest where a gun could be concealed. Jolly, 502 
N.W.2d at 182. On the other hand, a hand in the pocket during a robbery which the 
robber moved around was not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. 
Banks, 563 N.W.2d at 202-05. The distinction made by the Michigan courts offers a 
workable approach to preserving the distinction between robbery and aggravate robbery 
under the language of Utah's statute. 
Rather than requiring a representation of an item and a further representation that 
the item would be used to harm the victim or otherwise fit within the second aspect of the 
dangerous weapon definition, the court of appeals interpreted the dangerous weapon 
definition to require only that the defendant make a representation that he had an item, 
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which according to the court of appeals, was accomplished by a pointed finger in a 
pocket. Ireland, 2005 UT App 209, Hf7-13.3 Moreover, by allowing the subjective 
reaction of the victim to play a role in determining whether a defendant committed a 
simple or aggravated robbery, the court of appeals disregarded this Court's concerns in 
Suniville and opened the door for inconsistent application of the aggravated robbery 
statute based in part on a victim's predisposition for anxiety, fear or embellishment rather 
than the objective conduct of the robber. See id. Because the language of Utah's statute 
requires more than a representation of a weapon, the court of appeals' analysis should be 
rejected. Moreover, in order to consistently apply the aggravated robbery statute ad 
avoid defining aggravated robbery based on based on the emotions or sensitivities of the 
victim, this Court should reject the court of appeals' conclusion that the subjective 
response of the victim plays a role in defining aggravated robbery. 
A concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket fails to meet the definitional 
requirements of section 76-l-601(5)(b). Even if the gesture fits the first part of the 
In reaching its decision that section 76-1-601 requires only a representation of an item, 
the court of appeals listed several cases that elevated a robbery to an aggravated robbery 
when a defendant represented a simulated weapon. See Ireland, 2005 UT App 209 at [^10 
n. 1. Those cases are not persuasive since the statutes at issue in those cases contain 
different language and do not have the two part requirement set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-601(5). For example, the statute at issue in State v. Lawrence, No. 9706017912, 
2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 318, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2001) required "that 
Defendant display[ ] what appear[s] to be a deadly weapon." Id.; see also State v. 
Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. 1991) (to elevate to aggravated robbery, statute requires 
that defendant use a simulated dangerous weapon); DeLeon v. State, No. CACR 89-118, 
1989 Ark. App. LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1989) (to elevate to aggravated 
robbery, statute requires that defendant be armed with a deadly weapon or represent by 
word or conduct that he is so armed). Because the statutes at issue in the cases listed in 
footnote 1 do not have the same definition and do not contain the two part test of section 
76-1-601(5), they should not be relied upon in interpreting Utah's statute. 
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definition as a representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, 
such a gesture, without more, fails to establish facts from which it is reasonable to 
objectively believe that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5yb)(T); see also Taylor, 628 N.W.2d at 58-60 (indicating 
that defendant must simulate a weapon and induce an objectively reasonable belief that 
he is armed in order to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery).4 Likewise, such a 
gesture fails to establish that the robber is in control of an item likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury so as to comply with section 76~l-601(5)(b)(ii). Since the language 
in subsection (b)(ii) must require something more than a "representation of an item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury," a gesture in a pocket, without more, 
fails to establish that the robber represented that he was in control of an item likely to 
cause death. Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(ii). Accordingly, a gesture is not 
sufficient to elevate a robbery to aggravated robbery. 
Because a concealed gesture does not meet both requirements of section 76-1-
601(5), it does not elevate a robbery to and aggravated robbery. The court of appeals' 
determination to the contrary rendered the second part of the statute superfluous and 
improperly included a subjective aspect to the definition. Rules of statutory construction 
require that the court of appeals' definition be rejected. Accordingly, Mr. Johnson 
4
 Under the weapons part of Title 76, a dangerous weapon is defined as "any item that in 
the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-501(5)(a) (2003). Although this is a distinct definition, it provides guidance in 
assessing whether the gesture represented a dangerous weapon and more importantly, 
whether it created an objectively reasonable belief that the item was likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury or otherwise fit within section 76-l-6-l(5)(b). 
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requests that this Court overturn the court of appeals' decision and require that a 
representation of a dangerous weapon be coupled with one of the requirements found in 
section 76-1-601 (5)(b)(i) or (ii) in order to elevate the crime to an aggravated robbery. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee Ryan Johnson, by and through counsel, respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that a concealed gesture in a 
pocket is not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. 
SUBMITTED this tf^day of December, 2005. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
PATRICK L. ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
FILED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OBTAH^PPELLATE COURTS 
00O00 
OCT 2 h 2005 
State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Ryan Wayne Johnson, 
Petitioner. 
Case No. 20050599-SC 
20040522-CA 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
certiorari, filed on July 8, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issues: 
Whether a concealed gesture of a hand in a pocket is 
sufficient to meet the criteria for aggravated robbery under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Date / Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
ADDENDUM B 
65 of 78 DOCUMENTS 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ryan Wayne Johnson, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 20040522-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UTApp 210; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 215 
May 12, 2005, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District, Salt 
Lake Department, 041900176. The Honor-
able Leslie A. Lewis. 
LexisNexis(R) Head notes 
COUNSEL: Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. 
DelPorto, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Patrick L. Anderson and Debra Meek Nel-
son, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: Judith M. Billings, Presiding 
Judge. WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, 
Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge. 
OPINIONBY: Judith M. Billings 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
The State appeals an interlocutory order 
granting Defendant Ryan Wayne Johnson's 
motion to reduce the charges from aggra-
vated robbery to robbery on six counts. The 
State argues that the trial court erred in in-
terpreting the term "representation" of a 
dangerous weapon in Utah Code sections 
7'6-6-302 and 76-1-601 to include only ver-
bal statements. Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-
302, 76-1-601 (2004). The State avers that 
Johnson's use of his hand in his pocket to 
simulate a gun constitutes a nonverbal "rep-
resentation" within the meaning of the Utah 
Code. Johnson argues that even if we de-
termine nonverbal statements or gestures 
constitute a "representation" under the stat-
ute, the [*2] victims did not have a reason-
able belief that "the item [was] likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury" as re-
quired by Utah Code section 76-1-60L nl 
Id. § 76-1-601 (5)(b)(i). We reverse on five 
counts and affirm on one count of the rob-
bery charges. 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Jackson. 
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2005 UT App 210; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 215, * 
nl We review the trial court's inter-
pretation of statutes for correctness. 
See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT App 275, 
P4,98P.3d433. 
Johnson was charged with a total of six 
counts of aggravated robbery in two sepa-
rate criminal informations. Four counts al-
legedly occurred in December 2003 and 
two counts in January 2004. Victims testi-
fied that on each occasion Johnson ap-
proached the victim and asked for money, 
that Johnson had a bulge in his right pocket, 
that he had his hand in his pocket, and that 
something was protruding which looked 
like a gun. The testimony was that Johnson 
made no verbal threats nor did he tell any of 
the victims that he had a gun in his posses-
sion. In addition, some of the victims testi-
fied that they complied [*3] with Johnson's 
requests because they feared for their lives. 
In State v. Ireland, No, 20040502-CA, 
113 P.3d 1028t 2005 UT App 209 also is-
sued today, we held that a "representation" 
constitutes both verbal and nonverbal 
statements or gestures. See id. at P10. Be-
cause the facts of this case are nearly iden-
tical to those of Ireland, the same reasoning 
applies. Consequently, we hold that the trial 
court erred in interpreting Utah Code sec-
tions 76-6-302 and 76-1-601 and that a 
"representation" may be made by both ver-
bal and nonverbal statements or gestures. 
For each of the six counts of robbery, John-
son's action of holding his hand in his 
pocket simulating a gun constitutes a "rep-
resentation" within the meaning of Utah 
Code section 76-1-60L Johnson's conduct 
is sufficient to sustain aggravated robbery 
charges so long as the victims "reasonably 
belie[ved] the item [was] likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(b)(1). 
After reviewing the record on each of 
the six counts, we determine that the vic-
tims had the requisite "reasonable belief to 
sustain an aggravated robbery charge in all 
but one of the six counts. In Ireland [*4] , 
we determined that there must be objective 
conduct by the defendant coupled with the 
victim's subjective apprehension to consti-
tute a reasonable belief. See 2005 UT App 
22 at PI2. In five of the counts, victims tes-
tified that they saw or assumed that Johnson 
had a gun, and for that reason they com-
plied with Johnson's request to give him 
money. However, the victim in Count I, oc-
curring in January 2004, "didn't think [that 
Johnson had a gun] because the bulge was-
n't big enough." Moreover, the victim stated 
she thought that Johnson "was very nice-
spoken [ , ] . . . not aggressive, not anything 
that would make you think that he was go-
ing to cause you harm." Clearly, this victim 
did not have the requisite reasonable belief 
that Johnson would cause "death or serious 
bodily injury," and the objective facts of the 
encounter reinforce this reasonable belief. 
Thus, there cannot be an aggravated rob-
bery charge for this count. 
Accordingly, we reverse on the four 
counts occurring in December 2003 and 
Count II in January 2004 and hold that 
those counts sustain an aggravated robbery 
charge under Utah Code sections 76-6-302 
and 76-1-60L See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
6-302 [*5] , 76-1-601. We affirm Count I 
in January 2004 as a robbery charge be-
cause the victim did not have the requisite 
reasonable objective belief to sustain an ag-
gravated robbery charge. 
Judith M. Billings, 
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Presiding Judge James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
ADDENDUM C 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 1 2 2005 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William Joseph Ireland, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040502-CA 
F I L E D 
(May 12, 2005) 
2005 UT App 209 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 031908349 
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan 
Attorneys: Michael A. Peterson and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
1l Defendant William Joseph Ireland (Ireland) appeals the trial 
courtfs judgment convicting him of aggravated robbery under Utah 
Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2004). We 
affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1f2 On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey Reinkoester (Reinkoester) 
worked as a sales person in the Fortier jewelry store in the 
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland entered the store 
wearing a thick, puffy coat and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted 
Ireland who responded, "I want you to go and get me all the money 
in the cash drawer right now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As 
Ireland made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester with his 
right hand, which he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat. 
Ireland's hand was held close to his right side with his elbow 
extending behind him. Reinkoester observed that Ireland gestured 
like he had a gun and described Ireland1s hand in his coat pocket 
as "pointing at [Reinkoester]." Ireland's hand was "definitely 
the conviction. The aggravated robbery statute provides that 
"[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing a robbery, he . . . uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute defines "[d]angerous 
weapon" as including a "facsimile or representation" of "any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Id. § 76-1-
601(5) (a) , (b) . Moreover, "the actor's use or apparent intended 
use of the item [must] lead[] the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." Id, 
§ 76-1-601(5)(b)(i). 
f8 Utah courts have upheld convictions for aggravated crimes 
when there has been some kind of verbal representation or threat 
that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon, even where the 
defendant did not display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann, 783 
P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding conviction for aggravated 
sexual assault where defendant raped a woman while telling her 
that he had a gun); State v. Reyos, 2004 UT App 151,1(3, 91 P.3d 
861 (upholding aggravated robbery conviction where defendant 
yelled, "Get the gun and shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the 
robbery but did not display a weapon); State v Candelario, 909 
P.2d 277, 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding sentence 
enhancement for robbery where defendant claimed to have a gun and 
threatened to kill the cashier but did not display or gesture 
that he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (upholding aggravated robbery conviction where 
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun while putting his hand 
on his bulging pocket). 
H 9 Ireland argues that the pointing gesture inside his coat 
pocket does not constitute a "representation" because it was not 
verbal. We disagree and hold that the statute does not require a 
"representation" to be verbal, but rather includes nonverbal 
gestures. 
1(10 In Candelario, we interpreted the term "representation" in a 
similar section of the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions. 
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code section 76-3-203(2) 
(the enhancement statute) provides that a sentence may be 
enhanced by one year when "!a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or 
the representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in Section 
76-1-601!" is used while committing a second degree felony. 
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203.8 (2004))). We defined "representation" as "an 
expansive term," meaning "a statement conveying an impression for 
the purpose of influencing action." Id. Moreover, we noted that 
"[s]uch a statement can be either in the form of a verbal 
assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at 278 n.2 (citing Utah R. 
til Turning to the facts of this case, we determine that 
Ireland's gesture of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket 
close to his right side with his elbow extended constitutes a 
representation of a dangerous weapon because such gesture was 
intended to look like a gun for the purpose of influencing 
Reinkoester to give Ireland all of the cash in the cash drawer.2 
i|l2 Moreover, we determine that Reinkoester reasonably believed 
that the "item [was] intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5) (b) (i) (2004). Reinkoester 
testified that he feared that if he did not comply with Ireland's 
request, he may be shot. Guns by their very nature are capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury. Reinkoester's belief 
was based not only on the subjective belief that he thought 
Ireland had a gun, but also on objective evidence. Reinkoester 
saw something "pointing at [him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. 
That something "looked like a gun." This is sufficient objective 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that one might have been 
injured if he or she did not comply. Seef e.g., Parker v. State, 
607 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Ark. 1980) (holding that victimfs subjective 
apprehension coupled with defendant's objective conduct was 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of aggravated robbery); 
Faulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d 365, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(determining that victim had "reasonable apprehension" where 
defendant used his hand covered with a sock to look like a gun 
and pressed it against victim's back); People v. Taylor, 628 
N.W.2d 55, 61 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding there was ample 
objective evidence that defendant either had a gun or simulated 
2. Ireland relies heavily upon State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 
(Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court held, under a previous 
version of the aggravated robbery statute, that the defendant did 
not commit aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket 
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, and made threats 
that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. Id. at 
962. The prior version of the aggravated robbery statute 
narrowly defined aggravated robbery as where the perpetrator used 
"a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon." Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1978). The court held that the "[d]efendant's menacing gesture 
accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to 
establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To 
hold otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and 
erode the statutory distinction between robbery and aggravated 
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since the Suniville decision, 
the Utah Legislature amended the aggravated robbery statute to 
include not only a "facsimile" but also a "representation" of 
"any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5)(a),(b) (2004). 
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ADDENDUM D 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery, 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
76-1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
